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I. INTRODUCTION
An investor who purchases shares in a corporation, at a price that
has been inflated by misleading information, suffers when the truth
comes to light and the share price falls. A consumer seeking financing
to buy a home suffers if a lender misleads the consumer about the cost
and features of a mortgage that the consumer subsequently obtains. In
the United States, investor protection regulations, as administered by
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), aim to
address the first scenario by providing remedies for fraud in
© 2016 Hilary J. Allen. Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School.
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connection with the purchase or sale of a security.' To address the
latter scenario, a slew of federal consumer protection legislation exists
that seeks to protect the consumer from unfair, deceptive, abusive, and
discriminatory practices.2 Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act3 (Dodd-Frank),
these consumer protection statutes largely have been administered by
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).4 In both of the
prior examples, the primary focus is on the harm that individual
investors and consumers can suffer at the hands of unscrupulous
actors. However, both investors and consumers are--collectively-
hurt more by the economic disruptions that follow a financial crisis
than they are by individual instances of misconduct.
Despite this, a shared characteristic of the SEC and CFPB is that
both agencies typically discharge their protector functions from a
direct perspective. Unfortunately, such an approach neglects the
indirect harm that consumers and investors suffer as a result of
financial instability. That is not to say that the SEC and the CFPB are
currently discharging their functions in identical ways: there are
certainly striking differences in culture and approach that are evident
when we compare the agencies and when we compare investor- and
consumer-targeted laws more generally.' A more detailed analysis of
such distinctions, and the design and purpose of the SEC and CFPB,
can be found in the other contributions to this Symposium. The aim of
this Article, however, is to illustrate the depth of harm that can befall
both investors and consumers in the aftermath of a financial crisis and,
1. The case law that establishes securities fraud as a cause of action is based on 17
C.ER. § 240.1 Ob-5 (2015). Samuel Buell has referred to Rule 1Ob-5 as a "supremely potent
and consequential provision of American administrative law." Samuel W Buell, What Is
Securities Fraud?, 61 DuKE L.J. 511, 511 (2011).
2. For a list of the "enumerated" consumer laws, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1002(12), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12) (2012). These
include the statutes mentioned infia text accompanying notes 136-139.
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Il1-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
4. It should be noted that the CFPB's jurisdiction to administer consumer financial
protection legislation is not complete: while it generally has the power to make rules
pursuant to the enumerated consumer laws, it has limited authority to supervise and enforce
compliance with those laws/rules for depository institutions and credit unions with total
assets of $10 billion or less. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(c)-(d). Instead, the primary banking
regulators supervise and enforce the consumer laws with respect to smaller banks.
5. As other contributors to this Symposium have discussed far more eloquently and
in far greater detail, investor protection regulation is more concerned with protecting
suppliers of capital to the financial system, and consumer regulation is more concerned with
protecting users of capital.
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in so doing, make the case that financial stability regulation-which
aims to prevent such crises-should be conceptualized as a vitally
important, albeit indirect, form of consumer protection and investor
protection regulation.
Viewing financial stability in this way suggests a critique of the
existing financial regulatory architecture in the United States, which
has a council of regulators, but no dedicated agency charged with
protecting consumers and investors from the indirect harms they suffer
in the wake of financial crises.7 Instead, the structures in place in the
United Kingdom and Australia offer a better alternative: both
countries have adopted the so-called "twin peaks" model, which
entails having only two financial regulatory agencies, rather than
dividing up regulatory jurisdiction by financial industry sector, as is
generally the case in the United States.8 Although not often described
as such, the twin peaks structure can be conceptualized as designating
one market conduct and consumer protection regulator to address
direct harms to investors and other consumers of financial products
and charging another, a prudential regulator, with preventing indirect
harms in the form of externalities that flow from institutional and
systemic failure.
The focus of this Article is on the latter, prudential "peak" and on
indirect consumer and investor protection; other contributions to this
Symposium will consider whether it is advisable to implement the
other "peak" in the United States (i.e., to create a single, unified
market conduct and consumer protection regulator). This Article
argues that the creation of a single prudential regulator, with an express
financial stability mandate and jurisdiction over all financial
institutions, would be the best regulatory design for promoting
financial stability. However, recognizing that it is unlikely that there
will ever be sufficient political will for such a restructuring in the
United States, this Article also stresses that both the SEC and the
CFPB, in their current forms, should strive to prevent crises and
protect investors and consumers in so doing.
6. I have previously argued that efforts to pursue the policy goal of "financial
stability" should be oriented towards avoiding externalization of the consequences of
financial system failure to people who are outside of the financial system and who have not
agreed to bear such risks. See filary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability"in Financial
Stability Ovemight Council, 76 OHio ST. L.J. 1087, 1098 (2015).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).
For further discussion of the FSOC, its mandate, and its limitations, see infia text
accompanying notes 74-76.
8. See infia text accompanying notes 85-94.
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The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part H will
provide a theoretical sketch of how financial crises indirectly harm
investors and consumers, before providing some more concrete data
from the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Financial Crisis or Crisis) and
its impact in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
Part fIT will then discuss how financial stability regulation, which
seeks to prevent such indirect harms, is administered in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. After concluding that the
regulatory architecture in the United States is suboptimal when
compared with the British and Australian alternatives, this Article
considers in Part IV how the U.S. regulatory structure might be
reformed to better address issues of financial stability. Part V offers
second-best, but perhaps more feasible, suggestions as to how the SEC
and the CFPB, in their current forms, might nonetheless make valuable
contributions to financial stability regulation.
II. INDIRECT HARM TO INVESTORS AND CONSUMERS
This Part will give a brief account of the magnitude of the
indirect harm that can flow from financial crises, justifying the active
engagement of the SEC and CFPB in financial stability regulation. As
a preliminary matter, this requires a brief discussion of the indirect
harms that can befall investors and consumers and how they fit within
the statutory mandates of the SEC and CFPB.
In both the Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19340 (Exchange Act), the SEC is mandated, in discharging its
functions, to "consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation."" The SEC has interpreted this statutory mandate as a
tripartite mission that requires it to "protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."'2
While there are a myriad of ways in which investors can be harmed,
the prototypical loss suffered by investors is the drop in value of shares
in which they have invested. While the SEC has always eschewed
merit regulation in the sense that it will not protect investors from
9. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch.
2A).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. ch. 2B).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b), 78c(f).
12. What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified
June 10, 2013).
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losing money as a result of bad investments,13 the SEC is also charged
with regulating the markets in which shares are traded; therefore, it is
appropriate for the SEC to protect investors in the stock market from
losses that arise not from idiosyncratic business decisions made by the
issuers of shares, but from the failure of the markets generally to
operate in an orderly and efficient way. As such, in discharging its
investor protection mandate, the SEC should seek to avoid financial
crises that can cause the stock market as a whole to fall: in the
aggregate, investors holding a diversified portfolio of stocks are
impacted much more by systemic events that reduce returns market-
wide than they are by the movement of the price of any individual
stock.14
The SEC should also remain mindful of the broader economic
ramifications of the failure of the securities markets. In this context,
certain portions of section 2 of the Exchange Act bear repeating:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets are effected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and
of practices and matters related thereto ....
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets
are susceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination
of such prices gives rise to excessive speculation, resulting in
sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of securities
which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion and
unreasonable contraction of the volume of credit available for
trade, transportation, and industry in interstate commerce ... and
(c) prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans and/or
obstruct the effective operation of the national banking system
and Federal Reserve System.
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment
and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and
which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the
general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of
security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges
and markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal
13. For a discussion of the arguments against merit regulation at the federal level, see
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Pice Faug 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 76-77 (2011).
14. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGALANALYSiS 35, 54 (2014).
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Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national
credit.15
This section 2 of the Exchange Act provides legislative direction for
the SEC to proactively regulate to avoid the widespread economic
consequences of securities market failure.
Similarly far-reaching ramifications can result from the failure of
the consumer credit markets. In the law review article that precipitated
the CFPB, Professors Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill framed the
harm to consumers to be avoided in terms of unnecessary costs paid by
consumers for financial services." In particular, they focused on the
unnecessary "transfer from consumers to sellers of credit."'7 The
CFPB's statutory mandate, as set out in section 1021(a) of Dodd-
Frank, reflects this intellectual heritage and requires the CFPB to act
for the purpose of ensuring "that all consumers have access to markets
for consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive."1 The CFPB is seeking to preserve access to credit that
is, in the aggregate, most vulnerable during crisis conditions, when
banks are failing and even solvent banks are nervous about the
continuing availability of funding.'9 In this type of environment, even
reliably creditworthy consumers and small businesses can lose their
access to credit," and credit is needed both for individual economic
advancement and collective economic growth.2 Indeed, it is precisely
the choking off of credit that translates financial crises into broader
economic recessions (often with significant increases in
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
16. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 56-58 (2008).
17. Id at 58.
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1021(a), 12
U.S.C. § 551 l(a).
19. Markus Brunnermeier refers to this as "precautionary hoarding":
Precautionary hoarding arises if lenders are afraid that they might suffer from
interim shocks and that they will need funds for their own projects and trading
strategies. Precautionary hoarding therefore increases when 1) the likelihood of
interim shocks increases, and 2) outside funds are expected to be difficult to obtain.
The troubles in the interbank lending market in 2007-08 are a textbook
example of precautionary hoarding by individual banks.
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipheing the Liquidity and Creht Crunch 2007-2008, J. ECON.
PERSp., Winter 2009, at 77, 95.
20. SeeArmour & Gordon, supranote 14, at 41.




unemployment levels).22 Thus, the consumer protection that Warren
and Bar-Gill were promoting, and that the CFPB is trying to achieve,
has the end goal of fostering broad economic well-being and is best
preserved by avoiding financial crises and maintaining a stable
financial system.
In their analysis of data from This Time Is Different Eight
Centuies of Financial Folly, economists Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff found that "[o]n average, unemployment rises for
almost five years [following a crisis], with an increase in the
unemployment rate of about 7 percentage points."3 They also found
that the average decline in per capita GDP resulting from financial
crises is 9.3% from peak to trough;24 that "the recessions surrounding
financial crises are unusually long compared to normal recessions,
which typically last less than a year";5 and that real government debt
increases on average 86% in the three years following a crisis.26
Importantly, as Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen has stressed: "These
are not just statistics .... The toll [of unemployment] is simply
terrible on the mental and physical health of workers, on their
marriages, and on their children.2 7 And the consequences of financial
crises are not evenly distributed-they can have particularly dire
consequences for young people first seeking to enter the workforce
during a recession28 and (at the other end of the spectrum) those who
have retired or are seeking to retire and whose retirement investments
shrink as a result of a crisis.9
The magnitude of this type of harm justifies (well-designed)
regulatory intervention. The remainder of this Part will look more
particularly at the consequences of the Financial Crisis in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in terms of employment,
access to credit, economic growth, and the stock markets.
22. See Brunnermeier, supra note 19, at 90.
23. CARMEN M. RnqHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, Tins TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 227 (2009).
24. See id. at 229-30.
25. Id. at 230.
26. See id. at 231.
27. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., A
Painfully Slow Recovery for America's Workers: Causes, Implications, and the Federal
Reserve's Response, Speech at the "A Trans-Atlantic Agenda for Shared Prosperity"
Conference (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen201302
I1 a.htm.
28. Allen, supra note 6, at 1094.





The causes of the Financial Crisis were manifold, but in its report
on the origins of the Crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(FCIC) summarized them as follows:
Trillions of dollars in risky mortgages had become embedded
throughout the financial system, as mortgage-related securities were
packaged, repackaged, and sold to investors around the world. When
the bubble burst, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages
and mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial
institutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages and had
borrowed heavily against them. This happened not just in the United
States but around the world. The losses were magnified by derivatives
such as synthetic securities.
The crisis reached seismic proportions in September 2008 with the
failure of Lehman Brothers and the impending collapse of the insurance
giant American International Group (AIG). Panic fanned by a lack of
transparency of the balance sheets of major financial institutions,
coupled with a tangle of interconnections among institutions perceived
to be "too big to fail," caused the credit markets to seize up. Trading
ground to a halt. The stock market plummeted. The economy plunged
into a deep recession.
3°
Risky mortgages were thus the building blocks of the Financial
Crisis, and complex financial innovations and short-term interbank
funding were the transmission belts. The suboptimal regulatory
structure in place in the United States was ill-suited to address the
proliferation of these problems. Notably, competition amongst the
United States' various banking regulators to attract institutions to their
jurisdictions resulted in laxer regulation, which allowed the
nonconforming mortgage market to flourish.' More generally, as the
United States Department of the Treasury noted in 2009:
While this crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the government
could have done more to prevent many of these problems from growing
out of control and threatening the stability of our financial system.
Gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of financial
firms presented challenges to our government's ability to monitor,
30. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINcIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xvi
(2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
31. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act Expansion of State Authority To
Protect Consumers ofFinancial Servces, 36 J. CoRP. L. 893, 909-20 (2011).
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prevent, or address risks as they built up in the system. No regulator
saw its job as protecting the economy and financial system as a whole.32
Complex financial instruments in particular fell through the regulatory
cracks.33
The Financial Crisis proved disastrous for the United States.
Notwithstanding unprecedented government intervention (in the form
of direct bailouts and liquidity support), banks
tightened lending standards, reduced lines of credit on credit cards, and
increased fees and interest rates. In the third quarter of 2008, 67% of
banks imposed standards on credit cards that were tighter than those in
place in the previous quarter. In the fourth quarter, 59% did so,
meaning that many banks tightened again. In fact, a significant number
of banks tightened credit card standards quarter after quarter until the
summer of 2009. 34
This lack of credit constricted economic growth: "[T]he US economy
contracted by 3.5 percent in the immediately following year 2009,
down from growth of 2.8 percent in 2007-a loss equivalent to
approximately $9 trillion ... *'3 Unemployment in the United States
peaked in October 2009 at 10% (with underemployment estimated at
17.4%)36-a significant rise from the rate of 4.6% that pertained in
June 2007."7 And this situation was not remedied quickly: the
unemployment rate did not drop below 6% until the last quarter of
2014. Several economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
have attempted to estimate "what it cost-the value of what society
gave up" as a result of the Financial Crisis." They conclude, with what
they describe as a conservative estimate, that every household in the
United States was between $50,000 and $120,000 worse off as a result
32. FinancialRegulatoryReform: A New Foundation, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 2 (June
17,2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf.
33. One particularly important financial innovation-the credit default swap-had
been expressly exempted from all regulatory oversight by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 to -461
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
34. FCIC REPORT, supra note 30, at 393-94.
35. Armour & Gordon, supra note 14, at 43 (citation omitted).
36. FCIC REPORT, supra note 30, at 390. This underemployment rate includes part-
time workers who would prefer to be fully employed and those who are too discouraged to
look for work, in addition to those who are unemployed and actively searching for work. Id
37. All statistics relating to unemployment levels are drawn from the United States
Department of Labor, Labor Force Statistics #om the (urrent Population Survey, BUREAU
LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 8,2016).
38. David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson & Harvey Rosenblum, Assessing the Costs and
Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial Cnsis and Its Aftermath FED. REs. BANK DALL. 1
(Sept. 2013), http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/eclett/2013/el 07.pdf.
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of the Financial Crisis (and that the country as a whole was between
$6-$14 trillion worse off). Obviously, the Financial Crisis hurt shares
in financial institutions, but the general economic malaise that the
Crisis unleashed ensured that even nonfinancial stocks fell:" the S&P
500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average did not recover from their
Crisis-related losses until March 2013."°
B. UnitedKingdom
"As a leading centre for the trading activity (whether by UK or
foreign owned banks), which underpinned the securitised credit model,
and as the home country of several leading global banks, the UK was
bound to be affected"" by the turmoil in the global markets that
radiated out from the United States in the latter half of 2008. The
United Kingdom was also adversely affected by the failure of its own
securitized mortgage financing market,2 which had developed in
parallel to the equivalent market in the United States."3 The British
bank Northern Rock was particularly reliant on the smooth functioning
of this securitization market and the short-term interbank funding it
used to finance its participation therein, and thus it failed when these
markets collapsed." In the end, the United Kingdom was forced to
nationalize Northern Rock, as well as the Royal Bank of Scotland,
Lloyds TSB, and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS),"5 but even this
intervention was insufficient, failing to maintain the normal
39. "The Standard and Poor's 500 Index fell by a third in 2008--the largest single-
year decline since 1974-as big institutional investors moved to Treasury securities and other
investments that they perceived as safe." FCIC REPORT, supra note 30, at 393.
40. Tom Lauricella, Dow Leaps to Recorg WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.coml
articles/SB10001424127887324539404578342723780666726 (last updated Mar. 5, 2013,
8:02 PM); Hibah Yousuf, What a Quarter! Dow and S&P at Record hgt, CNNMoNEY
(Mar. 28, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/28/investing/stocks-markets.
41. The Tmer Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Cnsis, FIN.
SERVICES AuTHoRrrY 29 (Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tumer-review.pdf
[hereinafter TurnerRevie].
42.
[Aln increasing supply of mortgages was available at very high initial loan-to-value
ratios as borrowers and lenders assumed that debt burdens were likely to fall with
continuous property price appreciation which delivered large increases in the value
of household assets. Though not to the same extent as in the US subprime market,




44. Id at 35.
45. Elizabeth E Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Cisis in the
United States, the United Kingdom, andAustralia, 55 ViL. L. REv. 509, 527 (2010).
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functioning of the financial system. As in the United States, these
failures were facilitated by the regulatory structure then in place: "[A]
long period of reduced economic volatility, which was attributed by
many informed observers to the positive benefits of the securitised
credit model, helped foster inadequate [regulatory] focus on system-
wide prudential risks."'
The United Kingdom suffered deeply as a result of the Financial
Crisis. The Crisis sparked a recession, and unemployment started to
rise sharply in 2008, peaking at 8.1% in late 2011.4" The rate only
started to recover in 2013. The United Kingdom only emerged from
recession in the fourth quarter of 2009; " then, buffeted by the
headwinds of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis (which itself was
triggered by the Financial Crisis),"0 it returned to recession in early
2012." In terms of stock market performance, the FTSE 100 Index
dropped precipitously from its June 2007 peak and did not return to
that peak level until November 2013.2 Finally, as the Bank of England
reported in its survey of credit conditions for the fourth quarter of
2008:
Lenders reported that they had reduced the availability of secured credit
to households in the three months to mid-December 2008. As in the Q3
survey, expectations for house prices and concerns about the economic
outlook were reported to have been factors contributing to this
tightening. A further decline was expected over the next three months.
Unsecured credit availability to households was reported to have
been reduced in line with expectations. A further fall was expected....
46. Turner Review, supra note 41, at 87; see also iufa text accompanying notes 78-
81 (discussing Australia's response to the Financial Crisis). For a brief discussion of the U.S.
analogue, see supr text accompanying notes 31-32.
47. Katie Allen, UK Unemployment Total IIts Highest in 17 Years, GUARDiAN (Oct.
12, 2011, 6:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/oct/12/uk-unemployment-
highest- 17-years.
48. See Economy Tracker. Unemployment BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/
10604117 (last updated Mar. 18, 2015, 11:40AM).
49. "The UK economy comes out of recession, after figures show it grew by 0.1% in
the last quarter of 2009, following six consecutive quarters of economic contraction-the
longest such period since quarterly figures were first recorded in 1955." United Kingdom
Profile---Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
18028620.
50. Why Did the Crisis Happen?, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/economy
finance/explained/the financial and economiccrisis/why_.did thecrisishappen/index en.
htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2014).
51. United Kingdom Profile-Timeline, supra note 49.
52. See TSE 100 Index GBP, WALL STREET J., http://quotes.wsj.com/index/UK/




Overall spreads on secured lending to households were reported to
have widened over the past hree months ......
Reductions in the availability of credit, and increases in the cost of
credit, continued into 2009.5
C Australia
Australia, on the other hand, emerged relatively unscathed from
the Financial Crisis. The country did not fall into recession," and its
employment rate remained substantially below the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average.6 The
OECD commented in 2010 that the Australian economy was "one of
the most resilient in the OECD during the global economic and
financial crisis."57 Australian banks continued to function relatively
well throughout 2008 and 2009: although they saw their profits
decline somewhat over that period, no government bailouts were
required.8 As a result, the availability of consumer financial services
was not interrupted in Australia in the same way that it was in the
United States and the United Kingdom.
One contributing factor to the lack of systemic failure in Australia
during the Financial Crisis was the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority's (APRA) requirement that banks hold higher levels of
regulatory capital against nonconforming residential mortgages,
ensuring that-unlike in the United States and United Kingdom-very
few of such loans were made.9 APRA, of course, has its own unique
history, which no doubt contributed to its strong stance on regulatory
capital requirements. In particular, APRA received significant public
criticism with regard to its supervision of the Australian insurance
giant H1, which failed in 2001-institutional memory of this episode
53. Credit Condiions Survey: 2008 Q4, BANK ENG. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.bank
ofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/ccs/creditconditionssurvey09 02.p
df.
54. Credit Condiions Survey-, 2009 Q1, BANKENG. (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.bank
ofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/ccs/creditconditionssurvey942.
pdf.
55. Brown, supra note 45, at 519.
56. Jennifer G. Hill, Wy Did Austraaia Fare So Well in the Global Financial Crisis.9,
M TBE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRisIs 203, 215 (2012).
57. OECD Econonic Surveys. Australia, November2010, OECD 2 (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/eco/46467368.pdf.
58. Brown, supr note 45, at 521-22, 524.
59. Id at 539. "The [nonperforming loan] ratio for housing loans of U.S. banks was
5.7% in 2009 and of U.K. banks was 2.4% in 2009. In contrast, the aggregate nonperforming
loan ratio for mortgages held by Australian banks was only 0.69% in June 2009." Id at 544.
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may partially explain APRA's firm approach to mortgages in later
years.' ° However, as this Article will explore, APRA's structure was
(and continues to be) calculated to produce a desirable culture.6' At the
very least, having a consolidated prudential regulator avoids the
regulatory competition that plagued banking regulators in the United
States, leading to increased deregulation as each regulator sought to
attract financial institutions to charter with it.62
That is not to say that APRA was entirely responsible for the
Australian economy's resilience-there were a number of contributing
factors, not least of which was Australia's strong trade relationship
with China.63 Furthermore, this Article does not mean to suggest that
no Australian firms failed as a result of the Financial Crisis:
Between 2007 and 2009, there were also collapses, totaling A$66
billion, of a number of highly leveraged organizations, including ABC
Learning, Allco Finance and Babcock & Brown. Finally, another string
of collapses, including those of the Westpoint Group and Opes Prime
Stockbroking Ltd (Opes Prime), resulted in massive retail consumer
losses.64
The key thing to note, however, is that these failures were more notable
for the direct harm they caused to investors and consumers-they did
not have the indirect systemic impact that the failure of institutions like
Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock had. Instead, the Australian
economy remained generally robust in the wake of the Crisis
(although, interestingly, the ASX 200 stock market index has yet to
recover the pre-Crisis high of 6748.90 points reached on October 12,
2007).5
III. FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA
The potentially dire consequences of financial crises justify the
implementation of precautionary financial stability regulation."6 As a
preliminary matter, this Part will first give some color on what
60. Hill, supra note 56, at 220-23.
61. See discussion inf"a Parts HI-T.
62. See Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 915.
63. Hill, supm note 56, at 276-77.
64. Id at 214-15.
65. See S&P/ASX 200 Benchmark Index, WALL STREET J., http://quotes.wsj.
com/index/AU/XASX/XJO/advanced-chart (select "10Y" hyperlink in "Chart Range" field)
(last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
66. Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U.
CH. L.J. 173, 178 (2013).
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"financial stability regulation" is. I have previously argued that the
proper aim of financial stability regulation is to maintain the smooth
functioning of the financial system, so as to prevent the externalization
of the consequences of risks taken within the system to people who
have not agreed to bear such risks.67 However, prior to the Financial
Crisis, financial regulation tended to be focused on the solvency of
individual financial institutions (especially banks), rather than
considering the stability of the system as a whole.6" Unfortunately, the
Crisis vividly illustrated that when stressed financial institutions try to
preserve their individual stability, their collective efforts can
undermine the stability of the system.69 Since the Financial Crisis,
regulators have become more open to a "macroprudential" approach to
financial regulation, which scrutinizes interactions and linkages
between financial institutions and markets, rather than focusing solely
on the institutions themselves." As a result, there has been a move
towards deploying traditional regulatory tools like institutional
leverage limits and capital requirements in new ways, such as adjusting
the requirements countercyclically "to tamp down an incipient boom
... and to loosen restrictions in a slump."7' Other types of post-Crisis
regulation aimed at promoting financial stability include activities
restrictions for financial institutions (such as the Volcker Rule) and
clearing requirements.72
Such measures are designed to avoid, or at least mitigate, the
indirect harm that a financial crisis can inflict on investors and
consumers, as explored in Part II. Notwithstanding the potential harm
to their investor and consumer constituencies, however, neither the
SEC nor the CFPB has an express statutory mandate to pursue
financial stability or to minimize the likelihood of future crises.
(Importantly, though, there is also no law that prevents the SEC or
CFPB from seeking to discharge their mandates by promoting
67. Seeid at 182.
68. Samuel G. Hanson et al., A MacroprudentialApproach toFinancialRegulation, J.
EcoN. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 3, 3.
69. See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323,
326-27 (2011).
70. Hanson et al., supra note 68, at 3.
71. Allen, supra note 6, at 1100. For example, "[T]he regulator can lower leverage
and/or credit-extension ceilings, and/or boost reserve and/or capital buffer requirements,
and/or raise liquidity minima and/or lower maturity mismatch maxima during boom phases,
while doing the contrary during slump phases." Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn:
From Institutional 'Safety and Soundness' to Systematic 'Financial Stability' in Financial
Supervision, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 201, 225 (2015).
72. Allen, supranote 6, at 1099-1100.
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financial stability.) Indeed, prior to the Financial Crisis, no regulatory
body in the United States had an explicit financial stability mandate,
and this was an important contributing factor to the severity of that
Crisis.73
In response to the Crisis, Dodd-Frank created a new council of
regulators named the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
and conferred upon it a mandate to "identify risks to the financial
stability of the United States" and "to respond to emerging threats to
the stability of the United States financial system.,4 The FSOC has a
fundamental flaw, though. It is expected to leverage the expertise of its
member agencies in its quest to promote financial stability, and thus it
does not have a substantial staff or resources of its own.7' However,
those member agencies, including the SEC and the CFPB, have no
express statutory mandate to pursue financial stability themselves.
Therefore, the pre-Crisis status quo prevails to some extent, in that
there is no large, well-funded U.S. agency dedicated to protecting the
financial system as a whole.76
Instead, the approach to financial stability regulation taken in
Australia (and now in the United Kingdom) is better calculated to
protect investors and consumers from indirect harm. To be clear, this
Article is not recommending the pro-Crisis approach to financial
regulation taken in the United Kingdom, which serves more as a
cautionary tale of what notto do.
By way of background, the Financial Services and Markets Act of
200077 created the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which had
supervisory jurisdiction over the entire British financial industry until
2012. The FSA was responsible for both market conduct (direct) and
financial stability (indirect) regulation.78 Although much praised in the
lead-up to the Financial Crisis,79 it became clear after the fact that
financial stability had lagged behind other regulatory objectives in the
FSA: "[T]he FSA favored efficiency over stability as a regulatory
philosophy, and.., that preference manifested itself in a laissez-faire,
market discipline-based approach that often eschewed the
73. Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundaton, supra note 32, at 2.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(A), (C) (2012).
75. Allen, supra note 6, at 1090-91.
76. See id at 1150-52.
77. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 (UK).
78. TUrnerReview, supra note 41, at 92.
79. Hill, supm note 56, at 222-23.
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interventionist regulation necessary as a prudential supervisor.' The
result was that the FSA was not
aggressive enough in demanding adjustments o business models which
even at level of the individual institution were excessively risky and
which pursued simultaneously by several banks, contributed to the
build-up of system-wide risks. In addition ... it is clear that in the
specific case of Northern Rock, the FSA also fell short of high
professional standards in the execution of its supervisory approach
81
This result is perhaps not surprising given the FSA's structure.
The pursuit of efficiency and financial stability can require the
implementation of diametrically opposite policies;82 therefore, asking
the FSA to serve two masters without directing it to clearly pursue one
over the other was fraught from the start. The political realities of
financial regulation are such that the public has very little interest in
financial stability regulation as long as the economy is healthy, making
it very difficult for regulators to resist pressure from the financial
industry to prioritize efficiency in good times.3 It is therefore
unsurprising that efficiency trumped stability as an objective in the
pre-Crisis FSA (and the same would likely be true if the United States
were to implement a single, monolithic financial regulator). Post-
Crisis, the United Kingdom recognized the flaws in the design of the
FSA and abolished it with the enactment of the Financial Services Act
of 2012. In place of the FSA, the United Kingdom adopted the twin
peaks model by creating two new bodies: the Prudential Regulation
Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. 8 Because the
Prudential Regulation Authority has not been given a primary charge
to promote efficiency or focus on individual investor and consumer
welfare, its mandate and identity are more tied to promoting the public
good of financial stability, and this structure is more likely to produce
80. Allen, supra note 6, at 1139 (citing TurnerReview, supra note 41, at 87).
81. TurnerReview, supra note 41, at 88.
82. "[C]ombining prudential and conduct of business regulation and supervision
clearly creates the danger that there will be inadequate specialist focus on either, and in
particular that a focus on conduct issues may crowd out prudential, particularly in good
economic times when financial instability risks may appear less pressing." Id at 92.
83. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends To Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1019,
1021 (2012).
84. Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21 (UK).
85. -hstory of the FCA, FiN. CoNDucT AuTHORYrr, http://www.fca.org.uk/about/
history (last modified Jan. 5, 2016).
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a regulatory culture in which the collective (albeit indirect) interests of
investors and consumers are prioritized over industry demands.86
Perhaps the most-cited example of a successful implementation
of the twin peaks model is in Australia. Financial regulatory reform
usually arises as a response to a crisis, but the restructuring of the
Australian financial regulatory architecture in 1999 was instead a
response to a deliberative "peacetime" study of financial system
regulation known as the "Wallis Inquiry." The Wallis Inquiry had been
"asked to analyse the forces driving change in the financial system and
recommend ways to improve current regulatory arrangements'"87 and
one of its key recommendations was the creation of an "Australian
Prudential Regulation Commission" (which later became APRA) that
would regulate the entire financial industry from a prudential
perspective. 88 Admittedly, when the Wallis Inquiry's report was
written, the authors took the view that financial stability "must be
addressed by the monetary authorities," rather than the prudential
regulator," but there has since been a global shift in understanding
about how financial stability regulation should be carried out.90 And
so, while the Wallis Inquiry recommended that "the systemic stability
of the financial system should remain the responsibility of the central
bank," rather than the prudential regulator,9' the regulatory structure in
Australia has evolved such that now "[t]he Reserve Bank of Australia
(RBA) and APRA each have responsibility for financial stability."' 2
APRA's mandate to pursue financial stability was made explicit
in 2006 when section 8(2) of the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority Act of 1998"3 was amended to direct it, in balancing its
objectives, "to promote financial system stability in Australia.''9 The
86. Michael W Taylor, The Road from "Twin Peaks"--And the WayBactk 16. CONN.
INS. L.J. 61, 81-82 (2009).
87. The Financial System: Towards 2010, FIN. Sys. INQUIRY 1 (Mar. 1997), http://fsi.
treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/FinalReportloverview.pdf [hereinafter Walis InquirJ.
88. Id at 42.
89. Id. at 24.
90. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation, Speech at the
47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 5, 2011), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20l10505a.htm.
91. Wallis Inquiry, supm note 87, at 23.
92. Fin. Sys. Inquiry Comm., supra note 29, at 233.
93. Australian PrudentialRegulation AuthorityAct 1998(Cth) (Austl.).
94. Id. s 8(2). The full mandate, as set out in section 8(2), directs APRA "to balance
the objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and competitive




United Kingdom's Prudential Regulation Authority now has a similar
mandate to APRA: Section 2B of the Financial Services and Markets
Act of 2000, which was added by the Financial Services Act of 2012,
provides that while the Prudential Regulation Authority's general
objective is to promote the safety and soundness of individual
regulated institutions,
[t]hat objective is to be advanced primarily by-
(a) seeking to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is
carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect on the
stability of the UK financial system, and
(b) seeking to minimise the adverse effect that the failure of a PRA-
authorised person could be expected to have on the stability of the
UK financial system.95
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Creating a PeakPrudentialRegulator in the United States
The U.S. regulatory structure, as it currently stands, is not
optimally designed to implement financial stability regulation.96 The
best way to protect both investors and consumers from the fallout of
financial crises seems to be to follow the Australian (and now the
British) model and create a new, unified prudential regulator with
jurisdiction over the entire financial industry.97 Like APRA, the new
prudential regulator should be clearly directed to prioritize financial
stability as its ultimate end98 and, in so doing, should work closely with
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal
Reserve) (which should retain control over monetary policy and its
powers to serve as the lender of last resort/market-maker of last resort
95. Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 2B(3) (UK).
96. The fractured architecture of the U.S. financial regulatory system facilitates
arbitrage and capture, making all regulation (not just financial stability regulation) less
effective. Looking more specifically at financial stability regulation, the FSOC, in addition
to lacking substantial funding and staff, is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and is thus more
susceptible to political pressures from the Executive than is desirable. Allen, supm note 6, at
1091.
97. At the very least, this consolidation would limit the scope for financial
institutions to arbitrage regulations by picking and choosing the regulators who will have
jurisdiction over them. See RICHARD ScoTr CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY R
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FiNANCiAL INSTITUTIONS 26 (4th ed. 2009).
98. APRA is directed "to balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency,
competition, contestability and competitive neutrality and, in balancing these objectives, ....
to promote financial system stability in Australia." Australian Prudential Regulation
AuthorityAct 1998s 8(2) (Cth) (Austl.).
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to financial institutions).99 Granting a strong, statutory financial
stability mandate to the new regulator could help forge a regulatory
identity that prioritizes the goal of avoiding indirect harms to
consumers and investors over the profitability of the financial sector.
As James Kwak has stated, "Someone who identifies as an
economically sophisticated steward of efficient financial markets will
adopt different policy positions than someone who identifies as a
defender of the 'little guy ....
In addition to giving the new regulator a statutory financial
stability mandate, it is important to structure the agency in a way that
makes it robust to deregulatory pressures. Similar to APRA (and some
of the existing U.S. financial regulatory agencies), the new agency
should be funded by industry fees and headed by a commission, the
members of which are presidential appointees who can only be
removed for cause.1' In this instance, a commission is preferable to an
individual director because commissioners could be selected who hold
different types of expertise; having five commissioners-each with a
different background in, say, banking, securities, insurance, derivatives,
and funds-would help ensure that no one industry segment would be
the dominant focus or model for prudential regulation."2 In a similar
vein, each commissioner should be required to testify before the
United States Congress on a regular basis so as to keep all of their
viewpoints salient, rather than leaving the agency's messaging to one
single commissioner.'3 Ideally, rather than operating under the aegis
of the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, "a public-minded subcommittee on financial stability
would be established within the [United States Senate] Committee [on
Finance] for the purpose of overseeing financial stability and the new
agency, so that the agency's political overseers are less likely to focus
99. The prudential regulator and the central bank would have to work in close
proximity and share information in order to effectively discharge their respective obligations.
100. James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Cisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LmvIT IT 71, 83 (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
101. "APRA is largely financed by fees imposed on the financial sector entities it
supervises as determined and collected by the Australian government-as a levy on
supervised entities." The Structure ofFinancial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in
a Global Marketplace, GROUP THIRTY 193 (2008), http://group30.org/images/uploads/
publications/G30 StructureFinancialSupervision2008.pdf. This is consistent with the
structure of many U.S. financial regulatory agencies, including the Federal Reserve and the
CFPB. However, the SEC is not self-funding. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REv 15, 29 (2010).
102. Allen, supr note 6, at 1144.
103. Id.
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solely on appeasing financial industry interests." " This type of
restructuring would provide the best possible environment to engender
financial stability regulation that can withstand the inevitable
deregulatory pressures that will arise when the economy is doing well
and, in so doing, minimize the chance of indirect harm to investors and
consumers.
Such investors and consumers will, of course, still require
protection from direct harms as well. While the optimal design of
regulatory architecture for direct investor and consumer protection is
beyond the scope of this Article, ' it is worth noting that by separating
prudential issues from direct consumer and investor protection issues,
we are more likely to avoid the pre-Crisis fate of financial consumer
protection regulation in the United States-which was often neglected
by banking regulators, who instead prioritized prudential issues."
Unfortunately, previous attempts to radically restructure the U.S.
federal financial regulatory architecture have all failed."7 There may
never be sufficient political will for a move to create a single, unified
prudential regulator, which would entail abolishing the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA); denuding the Federal Reserve of its bank-regulation
authority; federalizing insurance regulation; and reshuffling some of
the powers of remaining agencies like the SEC and the CFPB. If we
are indeed stuck with our current structure, then the FSOC will remain
the only entity in the United States with a statutorily mandated focus
on protecting financial stability, and the FSOC, which is only a
council, lacks the staff and resources of a substantial agency like
APRA or the Prudential Regulation Authority. Thus, the FSOC can
only succeed in its efforts to promote financial stability if agencies like
the SEC and the CFPB are committed to assisting the FSOC with
these efforts.
104. Id
105. As other contributors to this Symposium have noted, it may not be ideal in the
United States to unify all direct consumer and investor protection in one agency (as Australia
and the United Kingdom have done).
106. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industrys Misguided Quest
To Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 881,
882-83 (2011-2012).
107. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 447-48
(1995); CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 97, at 64.
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B. Working Within Existing Structures and Mandates
While neither the SEC nor the CFPB has an express mandate to
consider financial stability, this Article has made the case that both
agencies are open to interpret their statutory mandates as authorizing
them to pursue financial stability as a means of indirect investor and
consumer protection. Dodd-Frank, enacted in 2010, would lend a
degree of legislative support to such efforts because several of its
provisions confer something of an implicit financial stability mandate
upon the SEC and the CFPB. For example, section 112(b) of Dodd-
Frank requires each voting member of the FSOC (including the Chair
of the SEC and the Director of the CFPB) to submit an annual
statement to Congress regarding the threats they perceive to financial
stability; this requirement gives these voting members (and their
agencies) an implicit direction to monitor such threats. Sections 113
and 804 of Dodd-Frank give the voting members of the FSOC the
power to designate nonbank financial institutions and market utilities
as systemically important and thus requiring heightened supervision;
this grant of power serves as an implicit direction to monitor such
institutions to determine whether designation is necessary. Finally,
section 120 of Dodd-Frank authorizes the FSOC to recommend to
individual regulatory agencies that heightened regulatory standards or
safeguards be applied to activities or practices that pose a threat to
financial stability. This provision serves as an implicit direction for the
agencies headed by the voting members of the FSOC to monitor the
activities of the financial industry. Taken together, these provisions
provide further support for efforts by the SEC and CFPB to promote
financial stability.
To be clear, urging the SEC and CFPB to promote financial
stability is inferior to creating a stand-alone prudential regulator.
Because the legal foundations of the SEC's and CFPB's financial
stability mandates are not unequivocal, regulatory actions taken by the
SEC or CFPB in reliance on such mandates may be subject to legal
challenges.'°8 Furthermore, attempts by the SEC and CFPB to protect
investors and consumers indirectly by pursuing financial stability will
at times conflict with the types of measures best calculated to provide
direct protection to investors and consumers. The SEC, for example,
will face pressures (similar to those faced by the FSA in the United
Kingdom in the lead-up to the Crisis) if it attempts to balance its
108. For a discussion of legal challenges to financial stability regulation, see Allen,
supm note 66, at 185-86.
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mission to promote "efficient markets ... and facilitate capital
formation ' against a mission to promote financial stability. Given
the lack of political support for financial stability regulation when the
economy is performing normally, and given the SEC's history," °it
would not be at all surprising if the SEC were to ignore financial
stability concerns in the absence of a direct mandate to pursue them,
1'1
notwithstanding that pursuing financial stability might be the best way
to fulfill the "investor protection" part of its mandate (as well as
promote the orderly and efficient operation of the securities markets in
the long run).
Because the CFPB is such a new agency, there is little publicly
available information or institutional history to indicate its attitude
toward financial stability regulation. A number of speeches by CFPB
officials have briefly touched on the contribution that the agency can
make to financial stability,"2 but there has been little substantive public
discussion of the issue. Instead, public statements from the CFPB to
date suggest that he agency is focusing on direct consumer harms,
fulfilling its self-described mission to "help[] consumer financial
markets work" for Americans."3 However, this silence does not
necessarily mean that financial-stability-related issues are not being
considered behind the scenes at the CFPB-it is even theoretically
possible that the CFPB could focus on financial stability to the extent
that it neglects its direct consumer protection mandate (just as banking
109. See supm text accompanying notes 11-12.
110. See infa text accompanying notes 119-124.
111. While the SEC has certainly suggested it will assist the FSOC, it may be that it
sees financial stability as the FSOC's, rather than its own, concern. In a recent speech, SEC
Chair Mary Jo White stated that the "FSOC's current review of the potential risks to the
stability of U.S. financial system of asset managers is a complement to the work we are now
undertaking." Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory
Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry, Speech at the New York Times DealBook
Opportunities for Tomorrow Conference (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543677722#.VKy7Slu61UQ.
112. See, e.g., Examining Regulatory Burdens-Regulator Perspective: Heating
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts & Consumer Credit of the H Comm. on Fin. Servs,
114th Cong. 12-14 (2015) (statement of David Silberman, Associate Director, Research,
Markets, and Regulations, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); Implementing Wall Steet
Reform: Enhancing Bank Supervision and Reducing Systemic Risk Heating Before the S
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs 112th Cong. 67-70 (2012) (prepared statement
of Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); Richard Cordray, Dir.,
CFPB, Prepared Remarks at the Ruby Hutchison Memorial Lecture (Mar. 20, 2015),
http ://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-
cordray-at-the-ruby-hutchinson-memorial-lecture/.
113. The Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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regulators did prior to the Financial Crisis)."' However, early
indications are that the CFPB's identity has been sufficiently forged as
a protector of direct consumer rights and that it will focus on these
over and above the indirect protection afforded to consumers by
financial stability.
It would therefore be preferable to have a dedicated prudential
regulator to pursue financial stability in the United States, as in
Australia and the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, because such reform
is unlikely in the United States and the FSOC is likely to be hamstrung
in its efforts to promote financial stability without meaningful support
from the SEC and the CFPB,"5 these agencies should be urged
regularly to do their best to promote financial stability. The following
Part will give just a few examples of the unique contributions that the
SEC and CFPB can make in promoting financial stability and, in so
doing, protecting investors and consumers, respectively, from indirect
harms.
V. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SEC AND CFPB TO
FINANCIAL STABILITY
A. The SEC
Notwithstanding that it is the primary regulator of many
institutions that are integral to the proper functioning of the financial
system, the SEC has rarely approached the regulation of financial
intermediaries from a prudential perspective (with its "consolidated
supervised entities program" being a rare and disastrous exception).
'16
At best, "prudential supervision has been only a secondary
responsibility" for the SEC,7 which seems to have little affinity or
aptitude for this type of regulation."8 There are therefore open
questions about whether the SEC should continue to be responsible for
setting capital requirements for broker-dealers or regulating money
market mutual funds, given that both responsibilities involve
prudential concerns."9 However, this Article does not purport to
114. Wilmarth, supmnote 106, at 882-83.
115. Allen, supmnote 6, at 1091, 1145,1152.
116. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea ?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 728, 776 (2009).
117. Id. at 775.
118. Robert B. Thompson, The SEC After the Financial Meltdown." Social Control
over Finance?, 71 U. PImt. L. REv. 567, 569 (2010).
119. For a discussion of these issues, see Coffee & Sale, supra note 116, at 775-8 1,
and Gretchen Morgenson, Bailout Risk, Far Beyond the Banks, N.Y TIMEs (Jan. 11, 2014),
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answer these questions; instead, it emphasizes that financial stability
regulation concerns more than just the safety and soundness of
individual financial institutions. In particular, the integrity of the
capital markets within which financial institutions operate is also vital
to the proper functioning of the financial system, and the integrity of
the capital markets is clearly within the SEC's purview.
The SEC has, in the past, intervened in the capital markets during
crises to shore up financial stability.2' However, regulatory responses
formulated under crisis conditions are often less than ideal. Thus, the
SEC's focus on financial stability should not be limited to times of
severe market distress: financial stability should also be concerned
with ensuring that the financial system is robust to shocks,''
particularly because financial stability measures that are thought out
well in advance are less likely to be accompanied by unintended
negative consequences. Investor protection may be best achieved
indirectly by proactively regulating market structure to minimize the
market disruptions that, in the aggregate, can be most harmful to
investors.'2
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/bailout-risk-far-beyond-the-banks.html (citing
former FDIC Chair Sheila C. Bair).
120. The restrictions that the SEC imposed on short selling financial stocks in 2008
serve as particularly notorious examples of emergency SEC intervention in the capital
markets. Effective July 21, 2008, the SEC temporarily banned naked short selling in the
securities of a short list of large financial institutions. See Amendment to Emergency Order
Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary
Action To Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,190, 73 Fed.
Reg. 42,837 (July 18, 2008). On September 18, 2008, the SEC took the extraordinary step of
placing an outright ban on the shorting of stock in a broad range of financial institutions. See
Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Taking Temporary Action To Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No.
58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008). At that moment, the SEC was more concerned
with financial stability than it was with efficiency. See "Naked" Short Selling Antifraud
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58,774, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,666 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 17
C.FR. pt. 240 (2015)); see also Coffee & Sale, supra note 116, at 778-79 (describing the
tension between securities regulators and banking regulators). However, such last-minute, ad
hoc intervention resulted in unanticipated negative consequences for hedge funds and options
trading. As a result, these interventions received significant criticism after the fact.
Christopher Cox, who was Chair of the SEC at the time, subsequently characterized these
bans as his "biggest mistake." Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Market Integity vs.
Financial Stability, 71 U. PrTT. L. REv. 625, 633 (2010) (quoting Cox).
121. Allen, supm note 6, at 1124.
122. The SEC should also be cognizant that the existence of destabilizing asset
bubbles undermines its ability to carry out its more traditional methods of direct investor
protection.
The rising stock prices and mass psychology of bubbles cause the deterioration of
compliance by securities issuers and market intermediaries with securities laws in
three ways. First, bubbles alter the rational calculus of compliance with securities
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Part of the motivation for creating the SEC in 1934 was concern
about "unnecessary, unwise and destructive speculation" in the
securities markets.1 23 As a result, the SEC is-and has been since its
creation-mandated to "maintain orderly markets," which it does in
part by providing "a constitution-like structure for the markets,
providing rules that private parties might themselves provide in the
absence of government, while also shaping those rules in a way that
the private parties might not.'2 While it is true that, at some points
over the course of its history, the SEC has proved hesitant to intervene
to shape market structure-preferring instead to focus on its simpler,
more visible role of direct investor protection'25-this lack of inter-
ference can only be justified by a belief that markets are efficient and
that markets will order themselves to generate the best possible
outcome for investors as long as a level informational playing field is
created.'26 However, the intellectual foundations of such belief have
been called into question by the Financial Crisis: "[A] strong case can
be made that the events of [the Financial Crisis] suggest hat in some
ways market prices and market pressures may have played positively
harmful roles.''27 Furthermore, seismic changes have occurred over
the last decade in the way that the capital markets function
(particularly in light of the emergence of dark pools and algorithmic
trading), and these changes are eroding long-espoused theories about
the best ways to regulate markets for securities.' The SEC must
therefore decide how it will approach market regulation in this new
environment: in the interests of financial stability, the SEC should
approach market structure reform from the perspective that broad and
laws, such that securities issuers and market intermediaries, such as gatekeepers,
are under-deterred by antifraud rules. Second, bubbles exacerbate the behavioral
biases of issuers and intermediaries, causing them to over-discount their expected
liability under the securities laws. Finally, bubbles raise the costs of compliance
with securities laws for market participants by increasing agency and information
costs.
Erik E Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393, 432 (2006).
123. Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755, 757 (1984)
(citing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
124. Thompson, supmrnote 118, at 571.
125. Werner, supra note 123, at 755, 759-60.
126. For a discussion of how the federal securities laws are underpinned by the
efficient market hypothesis, see Yesha Yadav, BeyondEfflciency in Securities Regulation 14-
21 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-8, 2014).
127. TurnerReview, supranote 41, at 45.
128. Yadav, supra note 126, at 5.
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sustainable economic growth should be prioritized over short-term
gains for traders within those markets.
In particular, high-frequency trading should be addressed from a
financial stability perspective. High-frequency trading is executed
automatically by computers according to preset algorithms; it
generates profits by trading at high volume and high speed.2 ' While
proponents of high-frequency trading contend that such risks are
justified by the increased liquidity and efficiency that such trading
provides to the markets, as economist Andrew Haldane has noted:
"Speed increases the risk of feasts and famines in market liquidity ....
[High-frequency traders] contribute to the feast through lower bid-ask
spreads. But they also contribute to the famine if their liquidity
provision is fickle in situations of stress."13° Liquidity is most valuable
in times of distress, and high-frequency trading makes no promise of
liquidity at such times. The algorithms on which high-frequency
trading is based are designed to react to market events--often in a
correlated manner-and thus have the potential to magnify market
response to shocks and cause liquidity to seize up more quickly as a
result.3' A recent report by the Senior Supervisors Group (a group
comprised of senior financial supervisors from ten countries)
concluded, "The complexity of market interactions among [high-
frequency trading] firms and other market participants increases the
potential for systemic risk to propagate across venues and asset classes
over very short periods of time."'32 Importantly, the speed at which
such trading operates leaves it "largely impervious to real-time human
129. Id at 25-26.
130. Telis Demos & Norma Cohen, tMgh-Frequency Tmding Adding RisK, Haldane
Says, FIN. TIMEs (July 8, 2011, 12:09 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b77f05ec-a8ec-
1 leO-ab62-00l44feabdcO.htm1 (alteration in original) (quoting Haldane).
131.
[A]lgorithmic trades tend to be correlated, suggesting that the HFT strategies used
in the market are not as diverse as those used by human traders. In this context,
shocks hitting the small number of very active algorithmic traders might affect the
entire market. And, because high frequency trading firms are often very lightly
capitalised, this could generate failures. Handling the corresponding counterparty
risk could be daunting, given that HFT firms turn over their positions many times a
day, while clearing systems operate at a much lower frequency. Combined, these
elements could generate systemic market disruptions.
Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, The Flip Side. igh Frequency Tading, LONDON SCH. ECON.
& POL. Sci. 34, 35 (Feb. 2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/researchProgrammes/paulWoolley
Centre/pdf/FinancialWorldArticle.pdf.
132. Senior Supervisors Grp., Algoithmic Trading Briefing Note, FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. 1 (Apr. 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/bank
ing/2015/SSG-algorithmic-trading-2015.pdf.
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scrutiny,"' 133 ensuring that regulators may be limited in their ability to
stanch any mayhem until a crisis is well underway. The SEC should
therefore be urged to prioritize the threats that high-frequency trading
poses to financial stability as it considers market structure reform.
131
B. The CFBP
In 2011, the newly created CFPB was delegated many of the
consumer protection responsibilities that had previously belonged to
the existing banking agencies.3 Much of the consumer protection
legislation now administered by the CFPB pertains to the provision of
credit. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act16 seeks to
prevent discrimination in the provision of credit, the Truth in Lending
Act"7 seeks to promote better disclosure by institutions in the business
of providing consumer credit, and the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994138 includes provisions relating to both disclosure
and regulation of potentially abusive practices in connection with high-
cost mortgages. 13 These pieces of legislation all have laudable goals,
but-like much of securities regulation-they are primarily focused on
individual instances where consumer harm results, or is likely to result,
from the complexity of consumer financial products and the
consequent scope for deception, misunderstanding, and dispute.
However, there are a number of steps that the CFPB can take to reduce
the risk of financial crises, thus promoting collective economic well-
being and protecting consumers from indirect harms.
For example, pursuant to section 1034 of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB
is specifically authorized to take and respond to complaints regarding
financial institutions within its jurisdiction. A pattern of complaints
about a particular class of consumer financial products often indicates
133. Yadav, supra note 126, at 30.
134. The SEC is currently reconsidering equity market structures and how they are
regulated, a process that commenced with the issuance of the SEC's Concept Release on
Equity Market Structure in January 2010. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,
Exchange Act Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21, 2010).
135. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5516 (2012).
136. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. IV).
137. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 1).
138. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. I,
subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch.
41).
139. CARNELL, MACEY& MILLER, supranote 97, at 304, 311, 388.
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that the market for those products has become frothy." Ideally, the
CFPB would coordinate with the Office of Financial Research to mine
its complaints data sets for patterns and trends that indicate there is a
bubble developing in a particular product. Such data could also be
mined for patterns of complaints with respect to a particular financial
institution (rather than product category), which might suggest
problems in that institution's approach to risk management.'41 Impor-
tantly, there needs to be some type of "fire alarm" procedure in place
for escalating these patterns to the attention of the FSOC and its
composite agencies. (All of this also holds true for complaints made
to the SEC about fraudulent schemes associated with different types of
securities-trends identified in these complaints should also be
brought to the FSOC's attention.) While the CFPB's Office of
Consumer Response does already investigate groups of complaints
periodically to survey product- and issue-specific trends,142 it is unclear
if the analysis of such trends is used only for identifying frauds, scams,
and abuses in order to prevent them or whether the growth of these
types of frauds, scams, and abuses in relation to a particular institution
or product is considered as indicative of a problem with that institution
as a whole or the entire market for that financial product. There is
certainly nothing in the CFPB's "Consumer Response Annual
Reports" from 2012, 2013, or 2014 to suggest that it is looking for
threats to financial stability. The CFPB should be urged to do so.
In addition to gathering and analyzing complaints, the CFPB has
embarked upon programs to improve disclosure and educate
consumers; for example, as part of its "Know Before You Owe"
initiative, the CFPB has developed new mortgage disclosure forms
designed to "minimize consumer confusion and enable comparison
shopping to produce better functioning mortgage markets."'4' Such
reforms reflect a market-based approach in that they target market
failures with the intention of allowing better-informed consumers to
make choices that are better for them.'" The CFPB is also authorized
140. SeeGerding, supr note 122, at 403.
141. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study
of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflic 83 TuL. L. REv. 735,
752-53 (2009).
142. Consumer Response Annual Report July 21-December 31, 2011, CFPB 10
(Mar. 31, 2012), http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/201204_cfpbConsumerResponseAnnual
Report.pdf
143. Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL
L. REV 1141, 1160-61 (2012).
144. Id. at 1153.
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to take a more interventionist approach in situations where significant
consumer harm is unlikely to be addressed by market means: pursuant
to section 1031 of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB is authorized to prohibit
"unfair, deceptive or abusive" acts or practices in such circumstances.
From the outset, Warren and Bar-Gill conceived the CFPB as a
way of preventing or mitigating bubbles in consumer financial
products that might otherwise have systemic ramifications when they
pop. 145 However, it is possible that the CFPB will instead focus solely
on the welfare of the individual consumers who participate in the
markets for consumer financial products and services. This Article
argues strenuously that the CFPB instead consider these types of
initiatives in the context of their potential impact on financial
stability.'46
VI. CONCLUSION
The aggregated fallout from a financial crisis can prove much
more devastating to investors and consumers than individually
misleading and abusive practices. As a result, the SEC and the CFPB
would best serve their constituencies in seeking to prevent these
financial crises by committing to pursue financial stability as part of
their regulatory efforts, rather than ignoring what are admittedly less-
than-concrete mandates to do so. This will not always be easy because
financial stability regulation may conflict with the agencies' clearer
mandates of direct investor and consumer protection, but the
consequences of abdicating all financial stability matters to the
FSOC-which does not have the resources necessary to properly
implement, supervise, or enforce financial stability regulation-may
prove dire. Unless and until the United States is ready to take a leaf
out of the Australian and British books and create a single prudential
regulator, responsibility for financial stability regulation must
necessarily fall on agencies like the SEC and CFPB. To the extent that
either agency is currently considering financial stability as part of its
regulatory efforts, any dedication to such end may fade with memories
of the harrowing experience of the Financial Crisis. This Article
therefore urges the SEC and CFPB to expressly commit, and maintain
145. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 16, at 58-59.
146. "Consumer financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting
individuals from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic risk." Erik E
Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer Financial Protection and
SystemicRisk, 4 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv 435, 435 (2009).
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commitment, to protecting the financial system-even in the absence
of an express statutory mandate to do so.
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